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DANGEROUSNESS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
Franklin E. Zimring* 
Gordon Hawkins** 
INTRODUCTORY 
The question of dangerousness arises in criminal law whenever de-
cisions are taken in regard to the secure confinement of offenders: de-
cisions about remand in custody, bail, criminal sentencing, parole, 
providing statutory terms of imprisonment for particular offenses, and 
prison building programs. 
Whether the likelihood of future harm should have a role in deci-
sions about the use of imprisonment is the question we address in this 
article. This question is widely discussed in the literature on the juris-
prudence of sentencing, and has inspired "a lot of rather uncritical and 
polemical literature"1 and a good deal of muddled and emotive argu-
ment, with which we are not concerned. At the same time, some seri-
ously and deservedly respected scholars have, on this topic, advanced 
propositions and reached conclusions, which on consideration appear 
plainly illogical and untenable. Their contributions to the discussion 
are the focus of our attention here. 
The first section of this paper surveys some recent writings on the 
topic of dangerousness for major inconsistencies, which we regard as 
illuminating the special problem of dangerousness in the jurisprudence 
of criminal sentencing. 
The second section describes the "special problem of dangerous-
ness," for, we believe, the first time. The special problem is the fear 
that any admission of calculations of dangerousness into sentencing 
decisions will lead to an overuse of dangerousness, which may be 
worse than the inefficiencies and hypocrisies we confront when deny-
ing that future dangerousness is relevant to decisions about prisons. 
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The third section attempts to reorganize the recent debate about a 
variety of jurisprudential and procedural aspects of dangerousness. 
We argue that most recent contributions to the jurisprudence of dan-
gerousness can best be understood as attempts to limit the overuse 
problem discussed in the preceding section. 
Under these circumstances, the substantive differences among vari-
ous commentators have been overemphasized. A considerable com-
mon ground on dangerousness, particularly at the strategic level, has 
been overlooked. Much of the debate about dangerousness has been 
disagreement at the tactical level, a result of different guesses about 
how the world will respond to different doctrinal statements. We can-
not resolve these differences, but we believe there is value in pointing 
out that this is where differences now lie. 
!. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF DANGEROUSNESS 
When reading the works of an important thinker, look first for the ap-
parent absurdities in the text and ask yourself how a sensible person 
could have written them. When you find an answer . . . when those 
passages make sense, then you may find that more central passages, ones 
you previously thought you understood, have changed their meaning.2 
Three crucial problems in the jurisprudence of dangerousness are 
revealed by the lengths to which scholars will go to avoid them. These 
problems induce an apparent tolerance of mass imprisonment without 
acceptable justification - what we call Dr. Messinger's dilemma. 
They inspire the pursuit of alternatives to imprisonment which cannot 
function as alternatives when restraint is an important motive for the 
prison's use. And they lead to the adoption of inconsistent criteria in 
considering dangerousness and general deterrence as justifications for 
imprisonment. 
The devotion of a considerable amount of space to, a discussion of 
the problematic pronouncements of other scholars possesses more jus-
tification in this context than usually obtains in academic writing. In 
the following pages we reproduce a variety of arguments and analyses 
which seem vulnerable to criticism; but the reason for this is not solely 
or even primarily the identification of error. The principal reason for 
adopting this approach is that the mistakes thoughtful scholars make 
when discussing dangerousness provide insight into conceptual, moral, 
and political difficulties encountered when predictions of future behav-
ior are used in the determination of penal sanctions. 
2. T. KUHN, THE EssENTIAL TENSION xii (1977). 
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A. Dr. Messinger's Dilemma 
Some years ago one of us was coauthor of a book which advocated 
"breaking down the fusion of punishment with prison which has for so 
long dominated American penal policy and practice"; it proposed re-
stricting the use of imprisonment to cases where restraint of the of-
fender was an important function of the criminal sanction.3 A key 
objective of this proposal was the diminution of rates of imprisonment 
and prison overcrowding in America. This could be achieved, it was 
argued, by restricting sentences of imprisonment to cases in which 
they possessed a comparative advantage: 
A focus on the distinctive contribution of the prison to social order, and 
a practical concentration on that task, is the first step toward a rational 
and efficient policy. 
What is special about prison? What can it clearly do that other pun-
ishments cannot? It can confine people. It can keep them, at least while 
they are inside, from repeating the behavior against the general society 
that put them there in the first place. To go beyond this distinctive func-
tion is to enter a morass. . . . The basis of a sensible policy is to ensure 
that the prison does what it can - immobilize criminals - and then to 
find other, acceptable measures for doing what it cannot . 
. . . [T]he dominant justifying aim of incarceration in a prison should 
be incapacitation. Imprisonment should be the punishment of choice, 
not for all offenses as it is under current practice but primarily where it 
seems necessary to meet the threat of physical violence.4 
Dr. Sheldon Messinger, in an otherwise generous review of the 
book, took issue with the proposal regarding imprisonment of the 
dangerous: 
I disagree strongly with the principle arguably central to their proposals: 
namely, that the decision to incarcerate should be made to effect the 
"incapacitation" of offenders. . . . 
An incapacitative principle is a slippery slope. At the core of the 
notion, as the authors say, is "the prediction of future behavior." If this 
is what doing criminal justice is to be about, why wait for future 
criminals to commit crimes before incapacitating them? Surely we know 
the groups most likely to contain disproportionate numbers of firearm 
robbers, muggers, and other dangerous types. Why not incarcerate the 
members of these groups during their most dangerous years? There will 
be many false positives (i.e., wrong predictions) of course, but it seems 
possible that certain "forces of disorder" would be minimized by such a 
move. . . . [U]nder this plan, we wouldn't have proven that crimes were 
3. M. SHERMAN & G. HAWKINS, IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA 99 (1981). 
4. Id. at 100-01. 
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committed by those incarcerated. But that's not what incapacitation is 
about: it's aboutfuture crime .... 
. . . [W]ill following their recommendations result in the reduction of 
pressures for added custodial facilities by partially emptying out institu-
tions? I doubt it . . . . 
All in all, the changed penal world that the authors' recommenda-
tions would produce would look much like the one we already have -
for a while. It would mean something different right from the start, 
however, and, in due course, those more sensitive than Sherman and 
Hawkins to the possibilities of a principle of incapacitation would almost 
surely take over. This is truly something to care about - and to fight 
against.5 
The heading of this subsection points up the limited nature of our 
objection to Dr. Messinger's position. That objection is not that he 
rejects incapacitation as a purpose of imprisonment: there is no di-
lemma, metaphoric or actual, involved in finding that present knowl-
edge provides an inadequate basis for preventive imprisonment, or in 
questioning the morality of anticipatory sanctions, or in apprehension 
about the political implications of the acceptance of a principle of in-
capacitation as a justification for imprisonment. It is perfectly valid 
criticism of Sherman and Hawkins that in setting out to narrow the 
use of imprisonment in America they provided a recipe which did not 
narrow it enough. Indeed a radical critique of their proposal might 
question both the preventive justification for prison and its widespread 
use. 
But this is not, as we read it, Dr. Messinger's position. What is 
both troublesome and instructive about his position, and that of many 
other critics of incapacitation, 6 is that they simultaneously reject pre-
vention as a purpose of imprisonment and accept prison as the pri-
mary weapon in the armory of sanctions for criminal offenses. The 
dilemma in political, if not logical, terms is the acceptance of the insti-
tution and the denial of the legitimacy of its unique function. It is as if 
someone were to acknowledge the refrigerator as the most important 
of kitchen appliances while denying the necessity of keeping food cold. 
We do not direct attention to this anomaly to score debating 
points. For we have here a paradox that was not only a central feature 
of penological debate in the last decade, but which in the 1970s gained 
widespread acceptance as reformist orthodoxy. It is of sufficient sig-
nificance therefore to demand critical analysis and discussion. 
It is clear that opposition to preventive incarceration is deeply felt. 
5. Messinger, Book Review, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1197, 1197, 12()().01. 
6. E.g., A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENT (1976). 
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Messinger's martial rhetoric ("This is truly something . . . to fight 
against.") and the impassioned language of other critics of the inca-
pacitation principle is evidence of that. Yet what is it that they are 
trying to avoid? Criticism is not directed at the institution of impris-
onment nor at the gross overcrowding in American prisons. In re-
jecting Sherman and Hawkins' ''key choice" in relation to future penal 
policy ("redefining incarceration as a tool to be used to incapacitate 
offenders"), Messinger does not mention those matters. The Sherman 
and Hawkins policy proposal certainly implies acceptance of imprison-
ment, but it is not that aspect which Messinger attacks. 
Sherman and Hawkins argue that a policy of selective incapacita-
tion "would reduce the number of people who are imprisoned."7 Dr. 
Messinger reacts as if an expansion of prison population had been pro-
posed, and this is typical of the battle lines on dangerousness. In fact, 
one could argue that the adoption of dangerousness as a criterion for 
pretrial confinement could lead to a substantial reduction in the more 
than 100,000 pretrial prisoners currently held on remand. Yet no one 
supports it for that reason. Those who approve of preventive deten-
tion do so in the belief that many more will be confined. At the same 
time, those who oppose the explicit adoption of dangerousness as a 
criterion equate it with the expansion of prison populations and the 
construction of more and more prisons. 
If one compares the debate over rehabilitation as the purpose and 
justification of imprisonment with that about preventive detention or 
incapacitation, a curious asymmetry is apparent. Those who espoused 
rehabilitation as the primary purpose of imprisonment included both 
those who enthusiastically approved of imprisonment and those who 
favored decarceration. In theory, those who embrace incapacitation 
should be similarly distributed between those who want more offend-
ers imprisoned and those who want less. In practice, both those who 
favor and those who oppose the incapacitation principle believe that 
its use would lead to greater numbers being imprisoned. The Sherman 
and Hawkins policy proposal which associates acceptance of incapaci-
tation with a reduction in prison populations is both novel and gener-
ally unaccepted. 
B. Alternatives to Imprisonment That Aren't 
The dominance of imprisonment in penal theory and practice is 
nowhere more evident than in the consideration of other penal meas-
ures. Ever since prison became the prime instrument of legal punish-
7. M. SHERMAN & G. HAWKINS, supra note 3, at 120. 
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ment, other penal methods have been viewed as alternatives to it 
rather than as wholly independent measures. Those alternatives have 
not been proposed, nor have they evolved, because of their intrinsic 
merits; rather they originated as substitutes designed to deal with of-
fenders for whom imprisonment was considered either unsuitable or 
unnecessary. Probation in the early years of this century and commu-
nity corrections in the later years were principally seen by their origi-
nators as ways of keeping people out of prison. We are aware of no 
penal measure, with the exception of capital punishment, that has been 
advocated on grounds other than its superiority to and its capacity to 
displace prison as punishment. 
It is somewhat ironic then that whatever other functions new penal 
measures have served in this century, and no matter how they have 
thrived, they have not replaced imprisonment. Our point here is not 
merely that large numbers of offenders continue to serve prison terms 
despite the availability of alternative sanctions, but rather that in all 
but exceptional instances the widespread use of the alternative sanc-
tions has little or no effect on the rate at which persons are sent to 
prison. Thus when one compares imprisonment rates with probation 
rates, no inverse relationship between their use is apparent. In fact, 
when jail incarceration rates are also taken into account, what emerges 
is that rather than high imprisonment/jail incarceration rates being a 
corollary of low probation rates, there is a positive relation between 
the two. Moreover, many of those states which most frequently em-
ploy penal confinement to deal with offenders also tend most fre-
quently to employ probation. Table A, taken from the volume that 
incurred Dr. Messinger's disapproval, 8 shows imprisonment rates, 
probation rates, and jail incarceration rates for the twelve states which 
most frequently use imprisonment and the rates for the twelve which 
least frequently use it. 
If established modes of nonincarcerative treatment for offenders 
fail to reduce the use of imprisonment, more radical alternatives also 
seem unlikely to perform that function. Graeme Newman's recent 
proposal for the revival of corporal punishment9 illustrates a number 
of crucial themes. For one thing, the restoration of corporal punish-
ment is invoked, not for its own sake, but as an alternative to impris-
onment. For another, and this is more remarkable than the tendency 
of observers to disagree with Professor Newman's suggestion, no 
scholar to our knowledge has taken it seriously. In a period of gross 
8. Id. at 45. 
9. G. NEWMAN, JUST AND PAINFUL: A CASE FOR THE CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF 
CRIMINALS (1983). 
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TABLE A 
IMPRISONMENT, PROBATION, AND JAIL INCARCERATION RATES 
FOR THE TwELVE STATES WITH HIGHEST AND TwELVE WITH 
LOWEST IMPRISONMENT RATES 
Imprisonment Probation Jail Incarceration 
States Rate (1976) Rate (1976) Rate (1972) 
-------------------- [per 100,000] ------------------------
Top 12 
District of 
Columbia 334 904 564 
South Carolina 230 826 91 
Georgia 225 636 132 
North Carolina 214 804 47 
Florida 211 513 112 
Maryland 192 879 55 
Texas 167 860 84 
Nevada 159 710 125 
Michigan 137 684 46 
Oklahoma 133 415 69 
Virginia 126 336 66 
Arizona 125 590 90 
Bottom 12 
North Dakota 26 331 20 
New Hampshire 30 438 37 
Minnesota 39 374 15 
Hawaii 41 478 28 
Massachusetts 46 1265 32 
Rhode Island 53 458 
Pennsylvania 56 521 53 
Maine 57 261 24 
Utah 60 533 42 
Connecticut 62 520 
Alaska 63 465 27 
Vermont 66 686 1 
Source: LAW ENFORCEMENT AssISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS ON DECEMBER 
31, 1976 (1978). 
prison overcrowding, and in a field where almost any radical penal 
proposal can attract some kind of following, why is this so? 
One important reason why corporal punishment would not serve 
and is not seen as an acceptable and viable alternative to imprisonment 
also explains the failure of adult probation to make a significant im-
pression on prison populations. It is the capacity of prison, in contrast 
to alternative sanctions, to prevent offenders from committing offenses 
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against the outside community while they serve prison terms. Insofar 
as that is the reason for the imprisonment of the majority of the prison 
population, alternative measures cannot achieve their intended impact 
on prison populations because they do not serve that function. This 
point seems so simple and so central to the question at issue that it is 
hard to understand how a serious discussion of alternatives to impris-
onment could avoid confronting it. Yet it is avoided in contemporary 
literature with remarkable regularity. 
As long as preventive motives account for the majority of prison 
sentences, institutions like probation will deal principally with off end-
ers perceived as "nondangerous." The case is different with corporal 
punishment, for there is a real possibility that many offenders at the 
serious end of the criminal spectrum would be subjected to corporal 
punishment if it were available. But, as was almost always the case in 
the nineteenth century, they would undergo it as a supplement rather 
than as an alternative to imprisonment. 
That, simply put, is the reason for not taking seriously the pro-
posed reintroduction of corporal punishment, or any other 
nonrestraining sanction, as an alternative to imprisonment. It is only 
to the extent that offenders perceived as "nondangerous" are subject to 
prison terms that nonrestraining sanctions can compete with impris-
onment on equal terms. These considerations belong at the center of 
any serious discussion of penal sanctions for serious offenders. 
C. Dangerousness and Deterrence 
No scholar has contributed more to the jurisprudence of imprison-
ment than Norval Morris has. 10 On several occasions in recent years 
he has addressed the issue of using predictions of future behavior for 
determining that a criminal should be imprisoned. Initially he totally 
rejected "dangerousness" as a proper ground; later he accorded it a 
limited but significant role among the considerations relevant to the 
decision to imprison. Taken singly, both of Morris' arguments deserve 
careful attention; taken together, the path of his thinking and his 
change of position constituted the principal stimulus for this essay. 
It will be argued that the conceptual difficulties involved in Morris' 
initial position on "dangerousness" can best be explained as deriving 
10. See Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 627 (1966) [hereinafter 
Morris, Impediments]; N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974) [hereinafter N. 
MORRIS, THE FUTURE]; Morris, Punishment, Desert, and Rehabilitation, in EQUAL JUSTICE 
UNDER LAW 136 (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bicentennial Lecture Series 1976); N. MORRIS, MAD· 
NESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1982); Morris, On ''Dangerousness" In The Judicial Process, 39 
REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 102 (1984); Morris & Miller, Predictions of Dangerousness, in 6 CRIME 
AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1 (M. Tonry & N. Morris eds. 1985). 
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from apprehension of the "political danger in the current widespread 
acceptance of dangerousness as a justification for imposing imprison-
ment or as a basis for prolonging the duration of a prison term." 11 It 
will further be argued that, while Morris now accepts the prediction of 
future risk as relevant to the imposition of prison sentences, his spe-
cific proposal reflects a persistent ambivalence toward preventive con-
finement - an ambivalence which dominates the thinking of 
American scholars and policy makers in this context. 
Morris' initial position on dangerousness can be found in a chapter 
on the justification of imprisonment in his The Future of 
Imprisonment: 
Even when a high risk group of convicted criminals is selected, and those 
carefully predicted as dangerous are detained, for every three so incar-
cerated there is only one who would in fact commit serious assaultive 
crime if all three were released. . . . 
... [A]s a matter of justice we should never take power over the 
convicted criminal on the basis of unreliable predictions of his 
dangerousness. 12 
The argument and evidence in support of this position had been 
presented earlier in the chapter: 
It is important to note that our predictions can fail in two ways and 
that we have developed an extremely useful technique to conceal the 
more troublesome failures from ourselves. First, the two paths to fail-
ure. Let us suppose that we have to predict future violence to the person 
from among one hundred convicted criminals, and let me invent figures 
that are far superior to any we can now achieve in practice. Assume that 
of the one hundred, we select thirty as likely future violent criminals. 
Despite our prediction of danger, all one hundred are either released or 
left at large. Their subsequent careers are then followed, and with hypo-
thetical precision we know the results. Of the thirty we predicted as 
dangerous, twenty did commit serious crimes of violence and ten did not. 
Of the seventy we declared to be relatively safe, five did commit crimes 
of physical violence and sixty-five did not. 
Reading [these results] one might claim, "We had 80 percent success 
in our prediction, successfully preselecting twenty out of the twenty-five 
who later committed serious crimes of violence." Not bad. Of course, 
we failed to select five of the one hundred who later proved to be danger-
ous, but that seems a minor failure compared with the twenty serious 
crimes we could have prevented. Note, however, that we also failed in 
another way. We selected ten as dangerous - as likely to commit 
crimes of violence - but they did not. Had we imprisoned the thirty 
that we predicted as dangerous, in ten cases we would have failed in our 
11. N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE, supra note 10, at 72. 
12. Id. at 72-73. 
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prediction by needlessly detaining them. Put more succinctly, we made 
twenty true positive predictions of violence and ten false positive 
predictions. 13 
There is no logical error involved in this analysis or the conclusion 
derived from it. But a problem arises when Morris' argument regard-
ing the injustice of preventive confinement is contrasted with his advo-
cacy of "a general deterrent justification for the imposition of a prison 
sentence."14 Regarding this criterion for imposing imprisonment, 
which he approves on both moral and practical grounds, he says: 
The second criterion I have suggested - that of the necessities of 
general deterrence and the appropriateness of this offender for deterrent 
purposes - finds no place in current codes but remains, in my view, 
inescapable. It is, for example, the principle on which rests the entire 
structure of income tax sanctions. Not every tax felon need be impris-
oned, only a number sufficient to keep the law's promises and to en-
courage the rest of us to honesty in our tax returns. The present 
arrangements for imprisoning federal tax offenders are an object lesson 
in the parsimonious application of general deterrent sanctions: approxi-
mately 80 million tax returns were filed in 1972; only 43 percent of the 
825 individuals convicted for tax fraud were jailed. is 
The nature of the problem which the comparison of Morris' two 
arguments entails becomes evident if the calculus employed in relation 
to the prediction of dangerousness is applied to the issues of both dan-
gerousness and general deterrence, as shown in Table B. 
TABLEB 
FALSE PREDICTION AND THE JUSTICE OF IMPRISONMENT 
Dangerousness General Deterrence 
True Positives 33 0 
(Future Offenses) 
False Positives 67 100 
Total 100 100 
Morris' analysis of dangerousness argues the injustice of imprison-
ing 100 in order to prevent transgressions by 33, finding the practice 
unjust no matter how much crime this strategy might prevent. In 
other words, the moral case against the use of predictions of danger-
ousness as a ground for imprisonment is based on the injustice of im-
prisoning those who would not offend again. Yet imprisonment to 
13. Id. at 66-67. 
14. Id. at 76. 
15. Id. at 79 (citations omitted). 
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prevent the commission of crimes by others, 16 which by definition has 
a false positive rate of 100 percent, is approved. How can this be? If it 
is unjust to lock up 100 because 67 will not offend again, why isn't it 
more problematic to imprison 100 in order to persuade others not to 
commit future crime? And what is there in the nature of the debate 
about dangerousness which enables this paradox to be overlooked? 
II. FROM BASIC PURPOSES TO LIMITING PRINCIPLES 
One need not search far for the practical rationale underlying Pro-
fessor Morris' distinction between dangerousness and general deter-
rence as justification for the imposition of prison sentences. Early in 
his discussion of the concept of dangerousness, the following passage, 
which is central to his rejection of dangerousness, occurs: 
There is a seductive appeal to drawing a distinction between the dan-
gerous and the nondangerous and confining imprisonment to the former. 
It would be such a neat trick if we could perform it: prophylactic pun-
ishment - the preemptive judicial strike, scientifically justified - saving 
potential victims of future crimes and at the same time minimizing the 
use of imprisonment and reducing the time to be served by most prison-
ers. But it is a trap. Social consequences are often counter-intuitive. 
The concept of dangerousness is so plastic and vague - its implementa-
tion so imprecise - that it would do little to reduce either the present 
excessive use of imprisonment or social injury from violent crime.17 
Again, some pages further on he writes: 
So imprecise is the concept of dangerousness that the punitively minded 
will have no difficulty in classifying within it virtually all who currently 
find their miserable ways to prison and, in addition, many offenders who 
are currently sentenced to probation or other community-based treat-
ments. If one looks at the grist of the inill of city jails and state felony 
prisons it is hard not to drop these gnarled grains through the expansive 
hole of "dangerousness."18 
Many observers might think that deterrence carries both the same 
seductive appeal, and the same almost limitless potential for filling 
prisons, as dangerousness. In Britain in the late nineteenth century, 
the dominance of deterrence as the justifying purpose of imprisonment 
resulted in levels of imprisonment higher than at any other time in the 
country's history. 19 And in America in the late twentieth century, 
where deterrence has been described by Morris himself as the "pri-
16. Morris "intend[s] to exclude the fear of repetition of crime by this criminal. The concept 
is that of general deterrence, ... the deterrence of all who might be inclined to do what he has 
done." Id. at 76. 
17. Id. at 62. 
18. Id. at 72. 
19. M. SHERMAN & G. HAWKINS, supra note 3, at 58, 65. 
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mary and essential postulate" of our criminal justice system, 20 prison 
populations and imprisonment rates reached unprecedented heights. 
Yet it seems likely that for Morris the distinction between danger-
ousness and deterrence lies in the relatively overt and unambiguous 
character of the use of imprisonment to influence the behavior of those 
other than the prisoner himself. The false positive problem is an in-
trinsic definitional element of punishment for general deterrent pur-
poses, and thus the need for limits on the extent and duration of penal 
confinement dedicated to its achievement is plainly manifest. 
By contrast, what makes dangerousness peculiarly seductive, and 
gives rise to a special risk of limitlessness, is the ascription of danger-
ousness as a personal characteristic of the offender. For if dangerous-
ness is viewed as a personal trait, this leads inevitably to the confusion 
of dangerousness and desert when both are animating purposes of 
punishment. 
If dangerousness is ascribed to our hypothetical 100 offenders, this 
can easily be seen as an imputation of personal demerit and culpabil-
ity. Even if only some of the 100 would commit further offenses, the 
temptation to treat all of them as future criminals is strengthened be-
cause it can also be justified as what they deserve. And this reinforce-
ment of the grounds for penal treatment may generate an enthusiasm 
for confinement which in prospect justifiably alarms those familiar 
with American history and the current scene. 
The confusion or combination of general deterrent purposes with 
personal guilt, on the other hand, seems less persuasive and less prob-
able. In the case of general deterrence, the community's sense of ·~ust 
deserts" or retributive justice may create a limit beyond which punish-
ment seems unfair. But in regard to dangerousness, seen as a charac-
teristic of the person, no obvious conflict with retributive principles is 
apparent. Ironically, on this view, the evident unfairness of punish-
ment for general deterrent purposes constitutes an argument for ac-
cepting its legitimacy. 
The dilemma of dangerousness, that is of confinement for the pre-
vention of future crimes by the person confined, derives from the fact 
that the evident fit between means and ends, between prison and pre-
vention, is so good that if prison is to be used in this way it will almost 
inevitably be overused. Moreover, the tendency to overuse is aug-
mented by not one but two corollary features of the ascription of dan-
gerousness to individuals. First, as already noted, viewing 
20. Morris, Impediments, supra note 10, at 631 (Deterrence "figures most prominently 
throughout our punishing and sentencing decisions."). 
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dangerousness as a characteristic of a person invites the conclusion 
that the personal quality of dangerousness is something for which the 
individual is responsible and blameworthy. Second, it is often associ-
ated with the not strictly congruent assumption that dangerousness is 
a permanent and immutable condition. 
The tendency for dangerousness, as a criterion for sentencing to 
imprisonment, to generate overuse can lead to two different arguments 
for rejecting it. One of these arguments is principled, the other is not. 
The principled argument suggests that the results obtained, in utili-
tarian terms, will be closer to optimum when dangerousness is rejected 
than those which will inevitably follow if it is admitted and overused. 
Proponents of this argument may acknowledge that in t}\eory the as-
signment of a very limited role to predictions of future behavior might 
produce an even better result, and yet deny the achievability of this 
result in the real world. 
The second approach may be called the de facto argument. It con-
veys the kind of worldly cynicism which some American audiences 
admire. On this view, the best way to limit the use of preventive con-
finement is to prohibit it, knowing full well that the prohibition will 
not be fully effective. This tactic is calculated to moderate the use of 
preventive confinement; it is implied that such a prohibition, in its 
breach, will produce results preferable to either really effective prohi-
bition or formal acceptance. 
Professor Morris in The Future of Imprisonment probably sub-
scribes to the first, or principled, rejection of preventive confinement. 
This is evident from his emphasis on the limited accuracy of methods 
of prediction of criminal behavior. But this emphasis invites the ques-
tion: What difference would it make if, through the development of 
more refined prediction methods, it became possible to reduce the 
false-positive rate to one-third rather than two-thirds? There can only 
be a significant difference between these two states if there is an opti-
mal use of imprisonment which could be achieved with the aid of more 
rigorous and accurate human science than we now have, and if the 
rejection of dangerousness is being defended as the lesser of evils. 
It is not clear how far our ability to predict dangerousness would 
have to be improved to alter Morris' view. According to Andrew von 
Hirsch, even if, through the development of better data and more re-
fined prediction methods, the false-positive rate could be brought 
down, it would make no difference: "[T]he fundamental moral objec-
tion to predictive restraint is that it is not deserved. This objection 
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stands even were the prediction of future criminality accurate."21 De-
spite this categorical assertion, however, it is acknowledged that pre-
dictive restraint might be necessary for "a small class of especially 
fearsome cases: namely, defendants who stand convicted of serious 
assault crimes and who have extensive records of violence."22 
The pragmatic or de facto argument has not been explicitly made 
by anyone. But it seems to be implicit in the posture of those more 
sophisticated opponents of preventive detention who would not deny 
that prevention is in fact an element in pretrial detention but would 
argue that with formal acceptance its overuse would substantially 
increase. 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing review. First, a 
jurisprudence of imprisonment can accommodate the kind of paralo-
gism associated with Professor Morris' treatment of deterrence and 
dangerousness, and yet still result in the best achievable outcome in 
practice. Second, if the adoption of dangerousness inevitably tends to 
its overuse, the acceptability of a sentencing system that acknowledges 
dangerousness as a criterion depends on the design of strategies to 
minimize overconfinement. In fact, the definition of rules governing 
the use of imprisonment to incapacitate the dangerous offender be-
comes crucial to the case for the inclusion of incapacitation as a pur-
pose of imprisonment. We are thus led from a review of a debate 
about basic purposes directly into the discussion of limiting principles. 
III. LIMITING PRINCIPLES 
If limits on the overuse of predictions of dangerousness are central 
to concerns about the acceptance of dangerousness as a criterion for 
sentencing, they should play a significant role in discussions of the 
jurisprudence of dangerousness. In fact, limits on the use of a danger-
ousness criterion have been a central concern in discussions of danger-
ousness in the past decade, although the fact that the central concern 
is overuse is not explicitly acknowledged. And most of this discussion 
relates to the later views of scholars initially opposed in principle to 
the use of dangerousness at all. Frequently, as in the case of Profes-
sors Norval Morris and Andrew von Hirsch, an initial opposition to 
the use of preventive imprisonment is later qualified, but the same con-
cerns that led to the rejection of a dangerousness criterion now moti-
vate the demand for domesticating principles and procedures. 
In this section, we first attempt to identify limiting principles and 
21. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 6, at 125. 
22. Id. at 126. 
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procedures and then to discuss the prospects of those limitations, 
either alone or in combination, for facilitating a balanced use of pre-
dictions of dangerousness in criminal sentencing. Three basic tactics 
are identified in the recent literature for limiting the use of predictions 
of dangerousness: categorical exclusion, external principles of con-
straint, and presumptions and other allocations of the burden of proof 
of dangerousness. 
A. Categorical Exclusions 
Categorical exclusions are distinctions proponents of prediction 
would draw between varieties of prediction they would not allow in 
the jurisprudence of sentencing and those they would permit. Such a 
tactic is unnecessary in the context of a principled objection to all use 
of prediction in sentencing. If no prediction is permitted then no sub-
categories of prediction need to be identified for exclusion. 
Almost all categorical exclusions are based on the proposition that 
some kinds of prediction are more prone to problematic error than 
others. The dividing lines to be found in the literature are various. 
Distinctions are drawn between group and individual predictions. For 
example, Norval Morris in The Future of Imprisonment described an-
amnestic predictions based on close observation of a particular individ-
ual's past behavior as less subject to error than statistical or categorical 
prediction derived from data relating to groups of offenders; Morris 
thought the former might "properly be relied on to determine proba-
tion and parole conditions."23 Andrew van Hirsch rejects what he 
refers to as "individual prediction strategies" based on data derived 
from samples of offenders, in favor of "a predictive strategy that is 
oriented to categories of criminal acts. " 24 Distinctions are based on 
durational limits, as when very long sentences for preventive purposes 
are prohibited or made subject to special review. Thus it has been 
urged that offenders subject to sentences of extremely long duration 
should be provided an individualized review by an appropriate 
agency.25 
There are also distinctions based on the behavioral models used to 
establish risk, as when predictions based on clinical or medical models 
are excluded whereas those derived from more statistical models are 
23. N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE, supra note 10, at 32. 
24. A. VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS JN 
THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 150 (1985). 
25. See Zimring, Remarks of Franklin E. Zimring as Commentator, in Current Developments 
in Judicial Administration: Papers Presented at the Plenary Session of the American Assn. of Law 
Schools, December, 1977, 80 F.R.D. 147, 165 (1977). 
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approved. Thus Morris and Miller distinguish predictions "based on 
validated actuarial evidence" from clinical predictions made "on an 
intuitive, untested, and unverifiable basis"; they argue that "clinical 
predictions of dangerousness unsupported by actuarial studies should 
rarely be relied on."26 Further there are distinctions which relate to 
the mechanisms of review, as when parole predictions are opposed but 
predictions built into legislation or judicial decisionmaking are ac-
cepted. Such distinctions underlie proposals for the abolition of parole 
and the reallocation of the powers held by parole authorities to judges 
or the legislature. 27 
Finally, distinctions are drawn between criminal justice functions, 
as when preventive detention prior to conviction is rejected whereas 
after conviction it is approved. Thus the American Bar Association 
rejected pretrial preventive detention of "the dangerous defendant" on 
the ground that "[t]oo little is now known of the true need for preven-
tive detention and of the predictive techniques required to operate the 
system with tolerable accuracy."28 But it has accepted dangerousness 
as a determinative guide to the use of imprisonment, as have also the 
American Law Institute, the National Council on Crime and Delin-
quency, and two national commissions. 29 
While there are important differences between one topic and an-
other, the strategic character of the categorical exclusion argument is 
common to all: it views one kind of prediction as less dangerous or 
more useful than another. 
The categorical exclusion strategems share a number of common 
problems, including: first, insufficient evidence that the excluded tech-
niques are specially problematic, or the permitted techniques are relia-
ble; second, problems in policing the prohibited prediction procedures; 
and third, the difficulty of ensuring that the techniques of prediction 
permitted will not themselves be overused to compensate for the un-
availability of the excluded categories. 
The finding that one prediction technique is more problematic than 
another often seems to be based on intuitive judgment. Rarely is any 
solid empirical evidence adduced: there is seldom if ever evidence that 
reform reduces reliance on prediction of dangerousness; and never to 
our knowledge has the enforcement of a categorical exclusion been 
26. Morris & Miller, supra note 10, at 48. 
27. See D. FOGEL, " ••• WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF ••• " 192-208 (1975); TWENTIETH 
CENTURY FUND, TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 
(1976). 
28. STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE§ 5.S commentary at 69 (1968). 
29. See N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE, supra note 10, at 62. 
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conjoined with an estimate of variation in the total extent of reliance 
on such predictions. The second problem is more mundane but no less 
important; it is that of enforcing a jurisprudential prohibition, whether 
it be of clinical predictions or of those based on rehabilitative 
principles. 
The third problem might be termed the hydraulic hypothesis, in 
that the pressure created by exorcising prediction of dangerousness by 
some agencies, such as parole boards or clinical psychologists, may 
simply raise the level of reliance on such predictions in other areas -
thus neither reducing the influence of prediction in the determination 
of sentence levels or the margins of error associated with it. Even if 
judges or legislators were not overusing prediction when parole boards 
were doing so, there is no assurance that judges and legislators will not 
increase predictive activity to fill the vacuum created by the cessation 
of parole. If other agencies assume the exercise of predictive decision-
making to the extent that parole boards forgo it, there is no guarantee 
that they will not do it just as inexpediently. It might seem reasonable 
to expect that the fewer the agencies that can employ predictive pow-
ers the more the role of prediction in sentence determination will be 
reduced and the danger of overuse diminished. In fact there is no rea-
son at all to make that assumption. 
B. External Principles of Constraint 
External principles of constraint neither exclude considerations of 
dangerousness per se nor prohibit any specific kind of dangerousness 
computation. Instead, predictive criteria are permitted to influence 
decisions but only within limits defined by other criteria. Two exam-
ples here discussed are the so-called desert limits, central to the juris-
prudence of dangerousness expounded in the recent writing of Norval 
Morris, and the equality or parity principle which is emphasized in the 
arguments of other desert theorists such as Andrew von Hirsch. 
Norval Morris and Andrew von Hirsch may seem to approach this 
question along very similar lines. In fact, the difference between their 
respective views is substantial. Morris stresses the importance of "the 
proper use of predictions of dangerousness. "30 Von Hirsch sees almost 
no role for it to play except in quite unique and fortuitous circum-
stances. Even with desert limits, dangerousness can become one of 
two or three major factors influencing the choice between prison and 
nonprison sanctions for Morris, while a superficially similar prescrip-
30. Morris & Miller, supra note 10, at 46. 
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tion leads von Hirsch to accord dangerousness almost no practical 
importance. 
The use of desert as an external principle of constraint is the cru-
cial element in the revised position adopted by Norval Morris. It 
functions as a control on those features of predictive sentencing which 
led to the rejection of the dangerousness criterion per se. We cannot 
improve on Morris' own statement of his present position: "Punish-
ment should not be imposed, nor the term of punishment extended, by 
virtue of a prediction of dangerousness, beyond that which would be 
justified as a deserved punishment independently of that prediction."31 
The principle that the maximum of punishment should never ex-
ceed the punishment deserved was earlier enunciated by Professor 
Morris as one of three general principles to guide the decision to im-
prison. He made it clear in that context that the concept of desert he 
was employing was not that of the pure retributivist, which involves 
"matching" the severity of the penalty with the offender's culpability 
"as related to salvation or ethics," but rather one according to which 
the penalty is defined by what "would be seen by current mores" as 
appropriate. "The concept of desert" in this sense is "limited to its use 
as defining the maximum of punishment that the community exacts 
from the criminal to express the severity of the injury his crime in-
flicted on the community as a condition of readmitting him to 
society."32 
Desert thus conceived 
is, of course, not precisely quantifiable. There is uncertainty as to the 
judge's role in its assessment, argument as to the extent to which he 
ought to reflect legislative and popular views of the gravity of the crime 
if they differ from his own. And further, views of the proper maximums 
of retributive punishments differ dramatically between countries, be-
tween cultures and subcultural groups, and in all countries over time. 33 
Nevertheless the deserved punishment can be defined as "what is seen 
by that society at that time as a deserved punishment."34 
The application .of this concept of desert in the jurisprudence of 
predictions of dangerousness 
depends on the recognition that there is a range of just punishments for a 
given offense; that we lack the moral calipers to say with precision of a 
given punishment, "That was a just punishment." All we can with pre-
cision say is: "As we know our community and its values, that does not 
seem an unjust punishment." It therefore seems entirely proper to us, 
31. Id. at 35. 
32. N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE, supra note 10, at 60, 73-74. 
33. Id. at 75-76. 
34. Id. at 76. 
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within a range of not unjust punishments, to take account of different 
levels of dangerousness of those to be punished; but the concept of the 
deserved, or rather the not undeserved, punishment properly limits the 
range within which utilitarian values may operate; 
... [The] range of "not-unjust" punishments [is] measured in rela-
tion to the gravity of the offense and the offender's criminal record .... 
[U]niversally these are the two leading determinants of what are seen as 
just punishments. 35 
It is apparent that there are some problems involved in the applica-
tion of this concept of desert as a constraint on the use of predictions 
of dangerousness. In the first place, it is not clear how wide the "range 
of 'not-unjust' punishments" might be nor what limitation on the 
scope of predictive judgments the desert constraint would impos~. As 
von Hirsch has somewhat misleadingly put it: 
After stating that desert should be a "limiting" principle, Morris neither 
specifies the breadth of those limits nor suggests principles that would 
guide one in ascertaining them. 
The failure to define the retributive constraints has worrisome impli-
cations for Morris's view of prediction. One simply does not know by 
how much a sentence may be increased - beyond that justified on other 
grounds - in reliance on forecasts of dangerousness. To say that predic-
tion is permissible provided the sentence does not become excessive pro-
vides no guidance, if the criteria for excessiveness are left unspecified. 36 
This is misleading because Morris nowhere suggests that "a sen-
tence may be increased - beyond that justified on other grounds - in 
reliance on forecasts of dangerousness." But it remains true that Mor-
ris' specification of desert limits provides no guidance as to what sort 
of restriction those limits would impose, beyond the suggestion that "a 
Minnesota/Pennsylvania-type sentencing system ... gives some opera-
tive and ascertainable meaning to the upper limit of desert."37 
In the second place, if the "range of 'not-unjust' punishments" fre-
quently included both prison and nonprison sanctions, dangerousness 
might well become the sole basis for deciding between a sentence of 
imprisonment and its alternatives. Since desert is only a limiting prin-
ciple, within those limits cases that are alike in respect of the gravity of 
the offense may be treated unlike on the grounds of dangerousness. 
This is particularly disquieting for those who insist, as Andrew von 
35. Morris & Miller, supra note 10, at 37-38. 
36. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 24, at 141. 
37. Morris & Miller, supra note 10, at 39. The reference to a "Minnesota/Pennsylvania-type 
sentencing system" is to a series of guidelines, issued by an administrative agency, that specified a 
relatively narrow range of minimum and maximum punishment for a combination of specific 
offense and offender's prior criminal record. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND 
COMMENTARY (Minn. Sentencing Guidelines Commn. Aug. 1984). 
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Hirsch does, that "persons whose criminal conduct is equally serious 
should be punished equally."38 Indeed he makes precisely this point: 
Suppose one treats desert as supplying only those outer limits - that the 
sentence must fall somewhere between a and b - and then allows the 
disposition to be decided within these bounds on utilitarian grounds. 
This would allow two offenders, whose conduct is equally reprehensible 
but who are considered to present differing degrees of risk, to receive 
differing punishments. 39 
And where the difference in punishment is of a qualitative nature, as 
between custodial and noncustodial sanctions, the perceived inequality 
would be very considerable. 
A third problem with Morris' use of desert as an external con-
straint is that perceptions of dangerousness might well influence the 
community's perceptions of desert. It is important to consider the 
question of the relationship between the community's feelings about 
the offender's dangerousness and societal notions of desert. For in 
some instances dangerousness functions not merely as an influence but 
as the decisive factor in desert estimates. 
A passage from Joel Feinberg's Doing and Deserving illustrates the 
point: 
it may seem "self-evident" to some moralists that the passionate impul-
sive killer, for example, deserves less suffering for his wickedness than 
the scheming deliberate killer; but if the question of comparative danger-
ousness is left out of mind, reasonable men not only can but will disagree 
in their appraisals of comparative blameworthiness, and there appears to 
be no rational way of resolving the issue.40 
To Bentham, in his Specimen of a Penal Code, it seemed self-evi-
dent that for those with "perverse anti-social dispositions . . . [t]he 
punishment must be more severe."41 His justification for this was of 
course explicitly utilitarian: the "hardened character" or the "impla-
cable and barbarous heart" had to be "restrained by greater terrors. "42 
It is by no means self-evident, however, that such additional and spe-
cial punishment "would be seen by current mores as undeserved. "43 
Not infrequently special penalty ranges are advocated, and pro-
vided by law, because "legislative and popular views of the gravity of 
the crime" incorporate both estimates of the reprehensibleness of the 
offense and the dangerousness of the offender. There seems little 
38. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 24, at 40. 
39. Id. 
40. J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING 117 (1970) (emphasis in original). 
41. 1 J. BENTHAM, THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 167 (J. Bowring ed. 1843). 
42. Id. 
43. N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE, supra note 10, at 60. 
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doubt that not infrequently perceptions of dangerousness influence the 
construction of penalty scales for particular types of crime; for exam-
ple, those committed by peeping toms, exhibitionists, drug offenders, 
and some repetitive property offenders. 
This is a point of some significance when desert is defined in the 
terms suggested by Professor Morris. Elsewhere in his writings,44 he 
has questioned the wisdom and desirability of protracted terms of im-
prisonment, but not on the ground that they might not be deserved. 
Nor would it be possible for him to do so on the basis of a concept of 
desert which merely reflects "what is seen by that society at that time 
as a deserved punishment." Indeed if desert is only a barometric mea-
sure of public opinion or popular prejudice, the desert limit is inher-
ently flawed as a protection against the overuse of predictions of 
dangerousness. 
Andrew von Hirsch's principal criticism of Norval Morris' view, 
which is that it "permits the infliction of unequal punishment upon 
those whose criminal conduct is equally blameworthy,"45 reflects a dif-
ferent conception of desert and of the way in which it should act as a 
constraint upon the use of predictions of dangerousness in sentencing. 
Central to von Hirsch's conception of desert is the notion of "com-
mensurate deserts." According to von Hirsch: 
The central principle of a desert rationale for sentencing is commensura-
bility. Sentences should be proportionate in their severity to the gravity 
of offenders' criminal conduct. The criterion for deciding quanta of pun-
ishments should, according to this principle, be retrospective and focus 
on the blameworthiness of the defendant's actions. Prospective consider-
ations - the effect of the penalty on the future behavior of the defendant 
or other potential offenders - should not determine the comparative 
severity of penalties.46 
Although von Hirsch speaks of "commensurability in punish-
ment" and of "the principle of commensurate deserts,"47 he does not 
appear to mean that the quantum of punishment should be strictly 
commensurate with the culpability of the offender, which would in-
volve what Rupert Cross refers to as "a futile endeavor to equate in-
commensurables. "48 What von Hirsch appears to have in mind is 
proportionality, for he also refers to "the requirement of proportionate 
44. E.g .• N. MORRIS, THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL (1951); N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE, supra 
note 10. 
45. Von Hirsch, Utilitarian Sentencing Resuscitated: The American Bar Association's Second 
Report on Criminal Sentencing, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 772, 784 (1981). 
46. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 24, at 31. 
47. Id. at 34, 36. 
48. R. CROSS & A. AsHWORTH, THE ENGLISH SENTENCING SYSTEM 132 (1981). 
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punishment" and "the proportionality principle's requirements";49 
and his exegesis is principally in terms of what he refers to as "ordinal 
proportionality requirements. "50 
Proportionality as a "determining principle" means that "compari-
sons of the gravity of the criminal conduct should be decisive of rela-
tive severities of punishments."51 This is said to involve meeting two 
requirements: "The first is the requirement of parity. Persons whose 
criminal conduct is equally serious should be punished equally. The 
second is the requirement of rank ordering. Penalties should be 
graded in severity so as to reflect gradations in relative seriousness of 
the conduct."52 The assessments of ordinal proportionality "rest on 
familiar judgments of comparative blameworthiness. "53 Adherence to 
these requirements would "preclude the resolution of questions of 
• comparative punishment on grounds other than the blameworthiness 
of the offender's conduct."54 In other words, it would preclude pun-
ishing a particular offender more severely than others convicted of the 
same offense because he is a worse risk. 
Although von Hirsch sees desert as a determining principle in rela-
tion to ordinal magnitudes, he says that "it becomes only a limiting 
principle in deciding the system's cardinal dimensions of severity."55 
The issue of cardinal magnitude is the issue "of anchoring the penalty 
scale by fixing the absolute severity levels for at least some crimes. "56 
Because of "the greater difficulty of making cardinal desert judgments 
... [t]here seems to be no crime for which one can readily perceive a 
quantum of punishment as the uniquely deserved one. . . . The cardi-
nal limits will necessarily be imprecise."57 Nevertheless, von Hirsch 
sees that it is necessary "to establish the levels of severity appropriate 
for given degrees of blameworthiness. Otherwise, the crime-serious-
ness rankings and the punishment scale will 'float' independently of 
each other."58 
On the question of the limits imposed by cardinal desert considera-
tions, what he refers to as "the Constraints of Cardinal Proportional-
ity," von Hirsch says that a penalty scale "may infringe cardinal 
49. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 24, at 35, 37. 
50. Id. at 40. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. (footnote omitted). 
53. Id. at 43. 
54. Id. at 40. 
55. Id. at 39. 
56. Id. at 43. 
57. Id. at 43-45. 
58. Id. at 92. 
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proportionality if its overall severities are sufficiently inflated or de-
flated. "59 At the upper end of the scale, we have "serious crimes for 
which the severe penalty of imprisonment is manifestly deserved, and 
any lesser penalty would be disproportionately lenient."60 At the bot-
tom of the scale come "the lesser crimes for which imprisonment is 
plainly excessive. In between are the intermediate crimes."61 In re-
gard to the crucial issue of where the line should be drawn "so as to 
impose the severe sanction (imprisonment) for serious crimes and to 
avoid it for lesser offenses," "[c]ardinal desert considerations alone do 
not suffice ... , since ... [this] is in part a convention."62 
It is only at this point that other "non-desert considerations" be-
come relevant, and in particular crime prevention considerations in-
cluding the possibility of incapacitation strategy. Von Hirsch's 
proposal in this connection appears to be that predictions of recidivism 
"might be helpful," but only in the context of "a categorial incapacita-
tion strategy comporting with desert" which did not call for the differ-
ential punishment of offenders convicted of similar criminal acts. 63 
Thus if it is possible to identify certain crime categories, conviction of 
which is associated with increased rates of serious recidivism, "this 
might be reason itself for visiting such crimes with imprisonment - if 
that can be done in a manner consistent with desert principles."64 
In short, it would have to be done in such a way as not to violate 
parity by selecting individuals for enhanced punishment from among 
those convicted of a given crime, nor to breach ordinal proportionality 
by ordering penalties on a basis other than the seriousness of the con-
duct. Thus if conviction for certain crimes, e.g., burglary, indicates an 
increased risk of recidivism, this might warrant imposing the severe 
sanction of imprisonment - but only if all those individuals convicted 
of the same type of crime were punished equally, and at the same time 
persons convicted of other crimes of comparable gravity were also im-
prisoned, and only then. 
The von Hirsch position differs from that of Morris in that equality 
of treatment controls the \.lSe of the incapacitative strategy. The justifi-
cation for the selection of individuals for categorial incapacitation on 
the basis of the current-conviction offense is not extensively discussed. 
This may be because the circumstances required in von Hirsch's analy-
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 93 (footnote omitted). 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 93-94. 
63. Id. at 153-59. 
64. Id. at 153-54 (emphasis in original). 
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sis before predictions of recidivism may be considered are likely to be 
extremely rare, as well as entirely fortuitous; it would only become 
important in comparing two offenses, each of which could be right at 
the margin of presumptive imprisonment. 
Von Hirsch gives a hypothetical example in which robbers and 
burglars are both candidates for presumptive imprisonment on 
grounds of cardinal proportionality, although robberies have a slightly 
higher score on the seriousness scale. 65 The problem he addresses is 
whether robbers only should be imprisoned or both burglars and rob-
bers. This choice cannot be resolved by appealing to desert principles. 
Parity provides no guidance and rank ordering does not help. Cardi-
nal proportionality is not precise enough to settle the question, because 
it merely requires imprisonment for the worst crimes and rules it out 
for lesser ones. 
In some jurisdictions, von Hirsch suggests that prison population 
constraints might help to settle the issue. If not, then categorial pre-
diction evidence might be decisive when one category had a higher 
rate of serious recidivism than the other. 66 Curiously, the only justifi-
cation for this extremely limited exception to the rule that "it is wrong 
to rely on utilitarian grounds to decide comparative punishments"67 
appears to be that it is only a very small breach of the rule. 
It has to be said moreover that the logical basis for making judg-
ments about comparative punishments is never made wholly clear. 
Von Hirsch speaks, as we have noted earlier, of "familiar judgments of 
comparative blameworthiness."68 He says that the "judgments about 
the comparative seriousness of crimes and the comparative oner-
ousness of punishments . . . have their roots in moral and practical 
judgments that ordinary persons make in everyday life."69 
But about the logical status of these judgments, or of the related 
concept of desert, he tells us little more than that he does "not think 
purely subjectivist explanations - those that focus merely on others' 
negative feelings toward the actor, or the social functions of such feel-
ings - are satisfactory."70 Whether they are or not, it can hardly be 
regarded as satisfactory merely to assert that the virtually total preclu-
sion of incapacitative considerations in sentencing is required because 
of what has been called the "analyzed or ill-analyzed claim that pun-
65. Id. at 157-59. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 171. 
68. Id. at 43. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 51 n.*. 
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ishment is partly or wholly justified because or when it is deserved."71 
That claim may not be, as recent critics have asserted, "impossible to 
state ... coherently,"72 incapable of being "explained or developed 
within a reasonable system of moral thought,"73 or "multiply ambigu-
ous and vague."74 But von Hirsch's statement of it does nothing to 
reassure us. 
Von Hirsch acknowledges "the perplexities of desert."75 But in 
response to Francis Allen's rejection of the desert model on the 
ground that "the concepts of desert and commensurate penalties defy 
precise formulation and application,"76 he says merely that the "desert 
model cannot be dismissed simply by asserting that the concept is im-
precise. "77 The "imprecision" involved in the desert model, however, 
is not an incidental feature of that model. It derives from the fact that 
the judgments required in determining sentences which are propor-
tionate in severity to the "gravity" or "blameworthiness" of an of-
fender's conduct are "not merely 'difficult'; they are in principle 
impossible to make."78 This is hardly a matter which can be lightly 
dismissed as merely one of "the various unresolved theoretical issues" 
which need prove no obstacle to the development of "a coherent set of 
sentencing rules" based on a desert model. 79 
Here again a contrast between the constraining principles of Mor-
ris and von Hirsch is instructive. For Professor Morris, the distance 
between the floor and ceiling limits imposed by desert is quite consid-
erable and therefore troublesome to those concerned about the overuse 
of predictions of dangerousness. Von Hirsch's range is more re-
stricted, with the ceiling much closer to the floor, but how the limits 
are determined is obscure and appears arbitrary. 
C. Presumptions and the Burden of Proof 
In addition to substantive limits, a variety of procedural measures 
can be employed to inhibit the overuse of predictions of dangerous-
ness. There are contrary tendencies either to overestimate the impor-
71. T. HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 210 (1984). 
72. A. KENNY, FREEWILL AND REsPONSIBILITY 69 (1978). 
73. Mackie, Morality and the Retributive Emotions, 1 CRIM. Jusr. ETHICS 3, 3 (1982). 
74. T. HONDERICH, supra note 71, at 210. 
75. Von Hirsch, Book Review, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 819, 827 (1983) (reviewing F. ALLEN, 
THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981), and M. SHERMAN & G. HAWKINS, 
supra note 3). 
76. F. ALLEN, supra note 75, at 71. 
77. Von Hirsch, supra note 75, at 825. 
78. J. FEINBERG, supra note 40, at 117. 
79. Von Hirsch, supra note 75, at 828. 
506 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:481 
ta.nee of procedural controls or restraints or alternatively to disregard 
them entirely in the context of the overuse of predictions of dangerous-
ness. In spite of a general disregard for procedure in the jurisprudence 
of sentencing, a variety of special provisions relating to dangerousness 
have operated both in sentencing and in connection with the pretrial 
detention of those thought to be dangerous. 
Thus by requiring the government, when seeking the preventive 
detention of persons thought likely to commit crimes if released before 
trial, both to produce clear and convincing evidence that the safety of 
the community or any individual would be at risk if the defendant 
were released, and also to overcome a number of procedural hurdles, 
stringent limits have been placed on pretrial detention on the grounds 
of dangerousness. 
For example, under the District of Columbia Court Reform and 
Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, the Washington, D.C. courts were 
directed to determine and detain without bail any defendant who 
would endanger "the safety of any other person or the community."80 
In practice, however, the procedures for securing pretrial detention 
were so complex and elaborate that the impact of the preventive deten-
tion program on the city's criminal justice system was minimal.81 
The Federal Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 198482 has cre-
ated a new authority to deny release to those defendants who are likely 
to engage in conduct endangering the safety of the community. It de-
scribes two sets of circumstances in which a rebuttable presumption of 
dangerousness arises, and the burden is placed on the defendant to 
establish a basis for concluding that there are conditions of release 
sufficient to ensure that he will not engage in dangerous criminal 
activity. 
The first of these is when a person charged with a seriously danger-
ous offense has in the past been convicted of committing another seri-
ous crime while on pretrial release. 83 The second is where the 
defendant is charged with certain specific felonies punishable by ten 
years or more of imprisonment, involving either trafficking in opiates, 
narcotic drugs, or other controlled substances, or the use of a firearm 
to commit a felony. 84 In other respects, however, the procedural re-
quirements for the pretrial detention hearing are based on those of the 
80. District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, § 210, D.C. 
CODE ANN. § 23-1322 (1981). 
81. P. WICE, FREEDOM FOR SALE: A NATIONAL STUDY OF PRETRIAL RELEASE 2-5 (1974), 
82. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984). 
83. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. III 1985). 
84. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. III 1985). 
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District of Columbia statute. 85 
Moreover, the Act specifically provides that the facts on which the 
judicial officer bases a finding that no form of conditional release is 
adequate to assure the safety of any other person and the community 
must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. 86 This empha-
sizes the requirement that there must be an evidentiary basis for the 
facts that lead the judicial officer to conclude that pretrial detention is 
necessary. For example, evidence such as records of arrest and con-
viction must be presented if the criminal history of the defendant is 
relied on; and evidence of the specific elements or circumstances of the 
current offense that tend to indicate that the defendant will pose a 
danger to the safety of the community must be adduced, if the danger-
ous nature of that offense is to be the basis of detention. 87 
The conditions formerly governing the imposition of increased 
sentences for "dangerous special offenders" provide another example 
of control on predictions of dangerousness. In determining "danger-
ousness" for the purpose of the legislation it was not sufficient to pro-
duce evidence of recidivism, however serious and extensive. The 
attorney representing the government had to file a notice "setting out 
with particularity the reasons why such attorney believes the defend-
ant to be a dangerous special offender."88 
Moreover, to establish that the defendant was a special offender, it 
had to be shown not merely that the offender was a recidivist, but that 
he had previously been convicted of two or more serious offenses com-
mitted on different occasions, and that less than five years had elapsed 
since his imprisonment or conviction or commission of the last such 
offense or some other serious offense. Alternatively it was necessary to 
show either that his offense was committed "as part of a pattern of 
conduct which was criminal" and "which constituted a substantial 
source of his income" and "in which he manifested special skill or 
expertise"; or that the offense was, or was committed "in furtherance 
of, a conspiracy with three or more other persons to engage in a pat-
tern of [criminal] conduct."89 
The ways in which these procedural hurdles might inhibit the 
overuse of predictions of dangerousness are twofold. In the first place, 
85. Cf. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 23-1322(c)(4)-(5) (1981). 
86. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (Supp. III 1985). 
87. H.R. REP. No. 98-1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3205. 
88. 18 U.S.C. § 3575, repealed (effective Nov. 1, 1987) by Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
of 1984, tit. II, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1987. 
89. 18 U.S.C. § 3575, repealed (effective Nov. 1, 1987) by Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
of 1984, tit. II, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1987. 
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the requirement of specific evidence of dangerousness might reduce 
the number of cases where dangerousness was erroneously found. In 
the second place, the special provisions and conditions, by raising the 
price of using predictions of dangerousness as a means of social con-
trol, would be likely to reduce the number of occasions when the gov-
ernment would be willing to invoke the relevant provisions, whether 
the dangerousness classification was correct or not. Thus, whether be-
cause fewer erroneous classifications are made or simply because fewer 
classifications of dangerousness (either correct or erroneous) are made, 
a reduction in the use of predictions of dangerousness is likely to be 
achieved. 
CONCLUSION 
All the strategems that have been arrayed in the last section have 
weaknesses when employed individually as a means of limiting predic-
tive sentencing. There remains the obvious question of how effectively 
they might operate when used in combination with one another. A 
conjunction of exclusionary controls, desert limits, and procedural re-
quirements might present a significant barrier to the overuse of predic-
tion. Indeed in some cases it is clear that some combination is 
necessary. Morris' "controlling principle for the use of predictions of 
dangerousness,"90 for example, would obviously require more specific 
control mechanisms for its implementation and could only be fairly 
judged in that context. 
It is necessary to add, as a further complexity, an emphasis not 
only on the structure of juristic controls but also on the spirit in which 
predictive sentencing is undertaken and controlled. Our text is taken 
from Johannes Andenaes: 
As a Norwegian Supreme Court judge once said: "Our grandparents 
punished, and they did it with a clear conscience. We punish too, but we 
do it with a bad conscience." Although the institution of punishment is 
necessary, it is a sad necessity.91 
What is required precisely in using predictions of dangerousness is an 
active and troubled conscience. 
If the peculiar peril emphasized in Section II, that a prediction of 
dangerousness is taken to imply moral fault, is correlated with over-
confidence in predictive judgments, then the risk of excess use is over-
whelming. There is no structural mechanism which would be 
90. Morris & Miller, supra note 10, at 2. 
91. Andenaes, The Morality of Deterrence, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 649, 653 (1970). 
December 1986] Dangerousness and Criminal Justice 509 
adequate to stem the tide of abuse likely to flow from such a 
constellation. 
An essential element in achieving proper limitation of the scope of 
predictive sentencing is an attitudinal or dispositional posture which is 
hard to define but not difficult to recognize in an ongoing system. A 
system that is skeptical about predictive capacities has less need to 
impose rigid restrictions on the use of predictions of dangerousness 
and less need to fear overuse than one in which overconfidence 
prevails. By contrast, widespread belief in the efficacy and legitimacy 
of predictive sentencing presents a situation in which a strong case can 
be made for the absolute prohibition of the use of predictions of dan-
gerousness under the aegis of the criminal law. Only those systems 
that do not trust themselves can be trusted by others to respect the 
considerable limits of a jurisprudence of dangerousness. 
